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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.ROMNEY LU1fBER COMPANY, a
corporation, and BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY,
a public corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8469

PETITION AND BRIEF ON REHEARING

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the plaintiff, appellant, and petitioner,
in the above entitled proceedings, and respectfully moves
and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing and
reconsideration of its former decision heretofore rendered in such cause under date of May 8th, 1956, upon the
1
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grounds, and for the reasons that this Honorable Court
erred in its determination and decision of said cause,
that it misconstrued or misapplied the existing law applicable to said cause, or failed to give due consideration
to important relevant facts and law, in the following particulars:

POINT I.
THAT THIS HONORABLE •COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER ENTERING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, UPON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A) THAT THE STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THE
PRE-SURVEY SETTLEMENT OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL
SECTION WAS THE ACT OF 1859 RATHER THAN THE
ACT OF 1891.
(B) IN HOLDING THAT CONGRESSIONAL ACTS
APPLICABLE, GRANTED AN "IN PRAESENTI" RIGHT
TO THE TERRITORY TO PRE-SURVEY, POTENTIAL,
SCHOOL SECTION, RATHER THAN AS A DIVESTMENT
OF THE SAME.
(C) THAT PATENT WAS REQUIRED TO EXTINGUISH THE TERRITORY'S RIGHTS TO 1i. PRE-SURVEY,
SETTLED, POTENTIAL, SCHOOL SECTION.
(D) THAT NO DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BY THE
·COURT AS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF ADVERSE
CLAIMANTS:

(1) As to Conflicts between Settlers;
(2) Paramount Authority of Congress To Grant to

Others or Retain Rights in Land Where Settlement Rights are Not Vested.
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THIS HONORABLE ·COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER ENTERING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, UPON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A) THAT THE STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THE
PRE-SURVEY SETTLEMENT OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL
SECTION WAS THE ACT OF 1859 RATHER THAN THE
ACT OF 1891.
TilL

lOOt

TH!

r::

'··

This Honorable Court in its opinion of May 8th,
1956, quotes the statutory enactment of the United
States Congress of 1859 (11 Statutes 385, 26 February,
1859, Section 2275 of Revised Statutes of the United
States of 1875) as follows:
"Where settlements, with a view to preemption, have been made before the survey of the
lands in the field, which are found to have been
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those se·ctions shall be subject to the pre-emption claim of
such settler, and, if they, or either of them, have
been or shall be reserved or pledged for the use
of schools or colleges in the State or Territory
where the lands lie, other lands of like quantity
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be
patented by pre-emptors * * *"
and assumes that as it was the statute in effect nearest
to the 1856 date of survey of the lands in controversy
between the parties to this suit (See p.age 2, Appellant's
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Original Brief, Section "B", Statement of Facts as to
Material Events), that the terms of such statute are the
applicable and controlling terms to be applied herein.
Yet, note, that while the Court applies the 1859
statute, retrospectively, it failed to consider .and apply
the 1891 Statute (Section 2275, Revised Statutes of the
United States as amended by Act of February 28th, 1891,
26 Statutes at Large, page 796, 51 Congress, Session II,
[See also Page 9 Appellant's Original Brief], which
reads as follows:
"Where settlements with .a view to preemption or homestead have been or shall hereafter be made, before the survey of the lands in
the field, which are found to have been made on
Sections sixteen and thirty-six, those sections
shall be subject to the claims of such settlers ; and
if such sections or either of them shall be granted,
reserved, or platted for the use of schools or colleges in the state or territory in which they lie,
other lands of equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected by said
state or territory, in lieu of such land as may be
thus taken by pre-emption or homestead settlers."
As indicated at page 9 of Appellant's Original Brief,
this act of 1891, was by Act of May 3rd, 1902, Public Law
102, Chap. 183, 32 Statutes at Large Page 188, 57th Congress, Ch. 683, made applicable to Utah, .anything to the
contrary in the enabling act, notwithstanding.
And, as will hereinafter be den1onstrated, the applicable terms of the 1891 Act rather than the 1859 Act of
Congress are the applicable statutory terms to govern,
likewise applied, retrospectively, for, as shown in the

4
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quoted extract of the Shepley v. Cowan case, 91 U.S. 330,
23 L. Ed. 424, as set out in the Gonzales v. French case,
164 U.S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, the federal
supreme court, has held in effect that the national congress, may at .any time before pre-emption or other rights
vest, or patent is issued, legislate concerning or affecting
the public domain, settled or otherwise. That is exactly
what it did in the 1891 Act, and, since no "vested" rights
intervened, as to either state, territory, or any invididual,
the congress was within its rights. Hence, the 1891 act
rather than the 1859 .act, is the governing statute, and
failure to so hold, is and was erroneous, and as will hereafter be shown, adversely affected the rights of this
petitioner.

:~:·:

I

rr,

(B) IN HOLDING THAT CONGRESSIONAL A·CTS
APPLICABLE, GRANTED AN "IN PRAESENTI" RIGHT
TO THE TERRITORY TO PRE-SURVEY, POTENTIAL, .
SCHOOL SECTION, RATHER THAN AS A DIVESTMENT
OF THE SAME.

As above pointed out in subpoint "A", a reading of
the 1859 and 1891 .acts present a considerably different
situation, as delineated by the wording of each.
Note that the language of the 1859 statute provides
for the lieu lands only as to such pre-settled land, as may
be afterwards "patented by pre-emptors", whereas the
later 1891 act provides for lieu lands as to l.ands "subject
to the claims of such settlers," a vital, and distinctly
different idea. Consequently, judged under the 1891 act,
a different holding would necessarily follow as to the
extinguishment of the territorial rights to section six-
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teen lands, where settlement thereon was made prior to
the survey thereof, since, neither settlement by preemptors or patent of the lands, as required by the earlier
act, are any longer made requisites under the later act.
See also in this connection argument commencing at top
of page 10 of Appellant's Original Brief.
And, the correctness of the above reasoning, is, in an
opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, .at least hinted at, in the following language, respecting the question of whether the school land grants to that
state were present grants by the terms of the statute,
or future grants, when the same have yet to be surveyed:
" ( 4) * * * However, if title to the particular
lands in question did not vest in the state upon
its admission to the Union, and has not since then
vested in the state, because of pre-emption and
homestead claims initiated by settlement prior to
government survey, because of the creation of
national forest reservations, * * *" Page 402
Pacific, Thompson v. Savidge, 188 Pacific Reporter 397, 110 Washington 486.
It is therefore submitted, that in accordance with
the above case, the cases therein cited of Heydenfeldt v.
Daney Gold, etc., Co., 93 U.S. 634, 23 L. Ed. 995, as explained in United States v. llJorrison, 240 U.S. 192, 36
Sup. Ct. 326, 60 L. Ed. 599; that the Territory of Utah
did not receive any interest in the instant section sixteen as asserted in the Court's original opinion herein,
and, which, as under the 1859 Act, might have been regarded as a possibility.
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(C) THAT PATENT WAS REQUIRED TO EXTINGUISH THE TERRITORY'S RIGHTS TO A PRE-SURVEY,
SETTLED, POTENTIAL, SCHOOL SECTION.

It is submitted, that on the ,authorities, and reasoning as set out in Subpoint "B", above, that, the 1891 congressional act, being controlling, would not theref~re
require that the extinguishment of territorial rights be
based solely in situations where a "pre-emptor" obtained
a patent, as may have been the case under the 1859 .act,
and, therefore, to limit the appellant to the narrow
situation where a final, later patent should actually be
had, is erroneous.
And, in ,a further respect, it is believed that the
Court's decision is in error, since, if under its holding,
the patent is the sine qua non without which extinguishment of the territorial or state rights to the section cannot be had, the result of the holding is to bar the appellant and petitioner herein, from proceeding under the
federal remedial act, as hereinafter mentioned, and as
set out at p.age 18 of Appellant's Original Brief, to secure
that very patent which is the essence of the purported
extinguishment required.
(D) THAT NO DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BY THE
COURT AS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF ADVERSE
CLAIMANTS:

(1) As to Conflicts between Settlers;
(2) Paramount Authority of Congress to Grant to

Others or Retain Rights in Land Where Settlement Rights are Not Vested.
The Court quotes the language of Shepley v. Cowan,
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91 U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424, as quoted in Gonzales v.
French, 164 U.S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, as
indicative of the fact that no vested rights are acquired
by a settler until compliance with the requirements of
the statutes. That is true, in general, but, other aspects
of matters have a bearing thereon. In the cases, like
Railroad v. Stringham, 38 Utah 113, 110 Pacific 868, affirmed on appeal, the question as to adverse possession
arose between .a settler, who failed to make filings and
the like; and, what was in effect a grantee of the United
States, under a right of way selection. Now, as is shown
by the Shepley case, the federal congress, at all times,
until final vesting of title by perfection of pre-emption,
homestead filing, patent, or the like, has a pre-eminent
power over the public domain. Hence, a railroad right of
way under a federal grant, would have priority of a mere
settler on the public domain. Likewise, in the Gonzales
v. French case, supra, the sole issue .as to whether a settler, never having perfected his rights, is entitled to
claim as against the townsite entry or patentee under a
Congressional Act, relating to the same land. Obviously,
the federal power to control and legislate concerning
such lands as are still part of the public domain, is a part
of the national sovereignty which cannot be divested,
until the settler first OBTAINS a valid VESTED
interest in some manner to such land. In other situations,
where two settler claiiuants adverse as to the same tract
of land, the courts will support the rights of the earliest
one to make such compliance with federal law, such as
pre-en1ption, as will give hiiu a valid claim thereto. So
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much is clear, and is well settled law. BUT NEITHER
OF THOSE SITUATIONS, is the SITUATION THAT
EXISTS HERE. Appellant does not deny that the federal government is the paramount owner of the property
here, and, could by action of congress, or other lawful
authority, in the sw.ay of its power, grant the instant
land away, take it for public use, or otherwise, as against
appellant. What appellant is claiming is that same being
feder.al land, since the original settlement, with a "view
toward pre-emption or homestead" divested any potential claim of the territory or state, he, the appellant, as
the successor in interest of a chain of title showing the
requisite possession, may obtain title to this ground
under the federal remedial statute(s), (Section 1068, U.S.
Code Annotated, Title 43, Page 64 Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part). No pre-emption, or the like is a requisite
under this statute, nor, is the appellant relying on the
so-called non-transferable settlers' rights to give him
any rights, other than as to possessory rights, buttressed
by the territorial statute mentioned at page 12 of Appellant's Original Brief.
As pointed out at page 11, in Appellant's Original
Brief, even this Honorable Court, as indicated in Hamblin v State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402,
187 Pacific 178, has held th.at the filing of the pre-emption
rights was directory and not mandatory. Hence, in the
absence of the special situations mentioned above, where
there is a controversy between adversely occupying settlers, or between a non-complying settler, and a grantee
of the government, the government h.as always acted with
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leniency toward an occupant, and tended to protect his
rights. True, the settler cannot as a matter of right assert
his possessory right, unperfected as against his government, but, that is not the issue here. The appellant's
predecessor's initial settlement on the ground herein in
question, prior to the public survey thereof, barred any
rights of the territory and later the state from attaching
to this ground; and so, this court should permit the rehearing and reconsideration of this case, enter judgment
in favor of this plaintiff, appellant, and petitioner, to
the end that he can pursue his right to obtain title by
patent, under the federal remedial statutes, freed of any
adversary claim of the defendants .and respondents,
since they acquired nothing in the way of title from the
purported transfer of the alleged rights of the territory
or state to this potential school land, as such title never
initially attached to the ground in question.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, and of the arguments contained in Appellant's Original Brief, appellant and petitioner prays that further consideration be given this
cause, a rehearing and reconsideration be granted, and,
that the present opinion be vacated or modified, and
judgment in favor of the appellant and petitioner, plaintiff in the Court below, be entered, and a remand to the
district court to that effect be made.
Respectfully submitted,
R. S. JOHNSON
Attorney for Petitioner,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
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